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In this paper I will be offering my thoughts on the primacy of the corporal in understanding the 
environments we inhabit. I will be speaking from the perspective of an installation artist who takes 
this conceit as one of the  founding principles of her work. My work is predicated on 
understanding the immersive installations I generate with my collaborators environment primarily 
through the somatic perceptual systems. (SHOW MOVIE1) My aim here is to explore the notion 
that such installations can serve to enhance, or heighten corporal literacy. In this paper I will 
using the terms ‘literacy’ and ‘literate’ in an extended sense, frequently transposing their original 
meanings (which pertain to the written word) into meanings which refer to those understandings 
we glean through our senses. Just as in the visual arts the term visually literate is used to refer to 
the ability to make fine discriminations in the detail, texture and structures of visual phenomena, 
and in music the term aurally literate refers to a highly refined ability to identify the detail, texture 
and structure of sound, so I will using the term corporal literacy to refer to the ability to 
discriminate equally subtle details of the structurings and textures of corporal sensation which 
emanate from the somatic perceptual system1 during interaction with the environment. It is 
recognised that the visual and auditory perceptual systems cannot be separated out from the 
corporal. However, in this paper my focus will be on the somatic perceptual systems2, which 
incorporate the sense of touch, the kinaesthetic sense,  proprioception. And the physiological 
systems which allow us to sense subtle changes in pressure, temperature and so on. (Gibson; 
1968: Rodaway; 1994). 
 
The somatic perceptual system is concerned with knowing the world in a fundamental way, 
(SHOW MOVIE 2) that is through ‘feeling’ the world, both by means of an immediate and an 
extended sense of touch. It is through the somatic system that we can know (sense) our ‘place’ in 
the environment at a given time. For example, if we pay attention to the somatic we can feel the 
proximity of objects and others even when we can’t see them.3 [Peter Rodaway (1994, p49) notes 
that the blind can detect the presence of large objects through the sense of a  noticeable change 
in air pressure around the object] We sense as well as hear sound (through the excitation of the 
receptors in the skin and internal organs generated by sonic vibrations). Yi-Fu Tuan (1993) 
suggests “To lose an ability to feel, that is to touch, is to lose all sense of being in a world, and 
                                                
1 This term incorporates the sense of touch, the kinaesthetic sense , the visceral sense and proprioception, 
and thus extends beyond J.J>Gibson’s ‘haptic” perceptual system.  
2 In which psychologist J.J. Gibson (1968?) includes touch, the kinaesthetic sense and proprioception) 
3 Rodaway (1994, p49) notes that the blind can detect the presence of large objects through the sense of a  
noticeable change in air pressure around the object. 
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fundamentally of being at all.” (cited in Rodaway: 1994, p41). To refine the corporal means of 
understanding the world then, can only enhance our sense of being in the world. 
 
It is increasingly being argued that embodied understandings of the physical and social  
environments that we inhabit  underpin not merely our language (Lackoff & Johnstone;1980), but 
also our modes of thinking (Antonio Damasio; 2000, Gerald Edelman; 2001, Lackoff & Johnson:; 
1999). In this paper I will be suggesting that immersive digital installations which focus on a 
purely corporal understanding of the experience of being in that environment can enhance the 
experiential (and thus corporal) understanding of the world in which we live and communicate.  
 
This form of digital installation immerses their visitors in a shifting, multidimensional, multi-
sensory, world – a world permeated by spatialised sound, images and motion. (SHOW MOVIE 3) 
The visitor does not merely observe these environments s/he inhabits them. The world of the 
installation is thus not known from without, as something unfolding before you, but from within, as 
something  unfolding with you. In an immersive installation the visitors’ perception of the intricate 
interweavings of sounds, visual images, colour, physical textures, even smell is  mediated 
through an equally complex interweaving of the individuals’ perceptual systems. Sound and visual 
images are not only heard and seen, but also sensed through the body. The experience of an 
immersive installation is consequently never a detached experience, as the viewing experience 
can be, but an intimate one which addresses the ‘sensation of sensation’ directly through the 
somatic systems. (Neuroscientists  have shown that even the perception OF colour has 
measurable physiological responses which are extra to the primary neural responses of the visual 
system (Féré; 1887).) (SHOW MOVIE 4) When in the installation  visitors are active participants 
in the ongoing event, affected by the environment as they engage with it. In interactive 
installations the effect of their engagement is taken one step further, for they affect the 
environment directly by their behaviour.  As such these installations emulate in a particularly 
intense form the conditions which obtain in the process of perceiving the world we inhabit. They 
are, as such,  spaces for bringing to consciousness the processes of perception.  
 
But what of perception?  Gibson (1968) and Damasio (2000) argue that perception goes beyond  
the mere act of seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. Rather it constitutes, and is constituted by, the 
interaction between perceiver and environment.  
 
“The organism actively modifies itself so that the interfacing [between organism 
and environment] can take place as well as possible. The body proper is not 
passive….[rather] perceiving is as much about acting on the environment as it is 
about receiving signals from it.” (Damasio DE  p 224).  
 
This is more than pertinent to the experience of the immersive installation. 
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All the senses, including the somatic system, must be fully deployed in a multimodal immersive 
installation if the installation is to be ‘grasped’ or ‘understood’. Any interpretation of the installation 
environment, even those which invite such interpretation (e.g. Keith Piper, whose installation 
works are concerned with  making explicit issues raised by racism) makes itself known not merely 
by a conceptual interpretation but through a ‘felt’ interpretation of the issues. This mode of coming 
to know the ideas which lie behind the installation affects not only the more obvious senses, but 
also the general body state, our ‘state (or sense) of being in the world’.  
 
I would suggest that this ‘state of being in the world’ is similar to that described by Rebecca 
Skelton yesterday, and similarly “foregrounds the psychophysical experience’s of Husserl’s 
“lifeworld”” (Skelton (2003).  However, I believe that it has even deeper implications than that. 
Damasio (2000) and Edelman (2001) claim that our body state, our sense of being in the world’ 
underpins not only our sensational and emotional life, but also our thoughts and our belief 
systems. If thought itself is not immune to influences from the corporal then the enhancement of 
corporal literacy has far reaching implications. SHOW MOVIE 5 
 
The kind of immersive installations I am using as  my paradigm in this paper deliberately focus 
the visitors’ attention on the more subtle readings of the information reaching us from the 
senses4. These installations are ideal environments for helping the general public to become 
familiar with the intricacies of their corporal relations with their world, and thus of their ‘being-in-
the-world’. They deliberately direct participants’5 attention away from attending to the work as a 
representation of that which lies outside the body (that is from  understanding ‘what’ we perceive) 
towards attending to their sensation-al responses to the installation (that is to understanding  
‘how’ they perceive).  
 
It is rare that we are given the opportunity to attend to the complex interweaving processes of 
perception for its own sake. In everyday life what we ‘perceive’ is what we need to perceive at a 
given time. Our everyday perception is thus skewed towards the functional. Immersive 
installations provide an opportunity for the general public to engage actively, and consciously, 
with the process of perception for its own sake, and in doing so heighten both their corporal and 
their perceptual literacy in a variety of ways. 
 
Now it could be argued that all art forms serve to heighten our skills in perceptual discrimination, 
and by extension, our sense of ‘being in the world’. This cannot be denied. However, most art 
forms ask that a viewer or listener watch or hear an event as it unfolds before them, whether that 
                                                
4 Examples of which are Char Davies’s Osmose (1994?); Paul Sermon’s Telematic Dreaming (1994); Bill 
Viola’s Five Angles for the Millennium (2001), Susan Kozel and Gretchen Schiller’s trajets (2000) 
5 Necessarily they are not always successful, however anecdotal evidence suggests that the rate of success 
is relatively high. 
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event be a series of performed incidents or the act of viewing a painting or a sculpture6. Gibson 
points out that the senses of sight and hearing are ‘distant’ senses. That is the object of 
perceptual attention7 can be sited a considerable distance away from the perceiver and still 
impact on their visual and auditory perceptual systems. Immersive installations conversely require 
that we perceive primarily through the more intimate senses, touch, proprioception, the 
kinaesthetic sense, the sense of smell, of temperature, even of pressure. That said, they do not 
exclude the ‘distant’ senses – but they do ask that we employ them in a more intimate context. 
Sight and hearing must be used as  another means of accessing the very immediate, palpable 
environment the visitors find themselves in. The visitor is encouraged to allow the elements in the 
environment to manifest themselves not merely as visual or sonic images, but as sensations in 
the body. Through this we are deliberately laying ourselves open to an understanding of the 
deeper ‘forms of knowing’ which underpin not only our sense of being in the world, but also our 
understanding of the world. 
 
The kinds of non-rational understanding which are required for grasping immersive installations 
are, I would suggest, the matrix upon which our supposedly objective understandings of our world 
are built. These kinds of understanding in and of themselves constitute fundamental modes of 
thought which do not require translation into words to be understood (indeed such translation 
reduces them as shall be seen). And they may have more value than has , perhaps, been 
acknowledged. If Damasio, Edelman, Lackoff and Johnson  are correct these modes of 
understanding may colour the more conventional modes of reasoning which use words and 
symbols as their medium of communication. (It has been suggested that philosophers  may have 
been exercised to develop new philosophical systems not merely because previous explanations 
of the way the world is did not make sense conceptually, but because they were at variance with 
that philosopher’s ‘sense’ of the world. (Edelman 2001). Even scientist admit to following lines of 
enquiry which have no more scientific weight than other options open to them, but just ’feel’ right 
(hunches)8. Indeed, Edelman, a Darwinian neuroscientist, argues that “ …thought is a conscious 
process underlaid by a deep structure of necessary non-conscious mechanisms“ (Edelman 2000 
p 218)  and takes the position that  “…emotions are fundamental both to the origins of and 
appetite for conscious thought” (ibid.) 
 
These are not new ideas, however, merely reclaimed ideas, for the intuition that the corporal has 
a significant role to play in the way we think can be traced back to Henri Bergson. Bergson was, 
perhaps one of the first contemporary philosophers to suggest that the body is ‘minded’ and that 
                                                
6  Which is in itself constitutes an unfolding to the perceiver of various features of the artefact over time. 
7  And let us here consider a  sound event to be an ‘object’ of perception. 
8 It has even been suggested that philosophers too may have been exercised to develop new philosophical 
systems not merely because previous explanations of the way the world is did not make sense conceptually, 
but because they were at variance with their ‘sense’ of the world they engaged with. (Edelman 2000)  
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the corporal (sensation) colours our mode/s of more literary or verbalised understanding. As far 
back as 1910 he was exploring the workings of consciousness. He proposed that consciousness 
comprises more than reflective consciousness (through which we are able to recognise and 
analyse our world) but that it incorporates what he called ‘deep consciousness’ which constitutes 
our sense of being in the world. Deep consciousness is composed of  
 
“…a succession of qualitative changes … [which] melt into and permeate one 
another without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalise themselves 
in relation to one another.”  (Bergson (1910) p 104)  
 
He noted that our verbalised interpretations of this deep mode of consciousness are necessarily 
reductive. He argues that  
 
…we instinctively tend to solidify our impressions [sensed experience] in order to 
express them through language. Hence we confuse the feeling itself, which is in 
a perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially 
with the word which expresses this object.(Bergson, 1910; p130) (my italics) 
 
The word, he argues, “overwhelms or at least covers up the delicate and fugitive impressions of 
our individual consciousness” (ibid p131) offering only a reductive representation of ‘reality’.  
 
Bergson alerted his readers to the danger of confounding quantitative differences in  the intensity 
of perceived sensation with the felt intensive differences in quality or “shade” which constitute the 
body-state. These are not localised, but are complex, and spread across a number of co-existing, 
interwoven psychic states. Bergson was warning that  the reductive tendencies of reflective 
consciousness, which relies on symbolic references to the world, could lead to the diminution of 
the importance of the sense of the world, and obscure the importance of the corporal in 
understanding the environments, physical, social and cultural, that we inhabit.  His warning 
proved to be apt. 
 
Interestingly Bergson suggests that art can be a means of regaining contact with the deep 
corporal roots of consciousness.  
 
SHOW MOVIE 6 
“Sometimes the feeling which is suggested [by an artwork] scarcely makes a 
break in the compact texture of psychic phenomena of which our history consists; 
sometimes it draws our attention from them, but not so much that they become 
lost to sight; sometimes … it puts itself in their place, engrosses us and 
completely monopolizes our soul.” (TFW p 17) 
 
This is particularly apparent in immersive installations such as Sensuous Geographies 
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Although Bergson uses a linguistic turn which might raise difficulties for us in this century, with his 
talk of ‘soul’ and ‘psychic states’, his underlying ideas find resonances in the work of several 
contemporary neuroscientists who are according ‘emotion’, or ‘feeling’, a place in both reflective 
consciousness and the character of our modes of thinking. Bergson offers the argument that “a 
larger or smaller number of simple states make up [a] fundamental emotion” [1910, p.8]. He also 
suggests that deeper we go into consciousness “ …states of consciousness cease to stand in 
juxtaposition and begin to melt into one another …each to be tinged with the colouring of all the 
others.” (ibid. p164). This suggestion is echoed in Damasio’s notion of ‘background emotions’, or 
‘background feelings’, which Damasio argues underpin our sense of ‘selfness’9. Damasio 
considers the self not as static, resistant to the ‘ravages of time’, but a constant process of 
renewal, “Our sense of self” he argues, “ is a state of the organism, …  a vulnerable pattern of 
integrated operations…” (2000 p 145) which are both continuous and everchanging. 
 
Damasio suggests that the self has several modes of ‘being’, from the protoself (which is 
constituted by the deepest level of physiological and chemical responses) through to the 
autobiographical self of reflective consciousness. He makes similar distinctions with respect to 
emotion in his discussion on the role of ‘feeling’ in forming and reforming consciousness. He 
distinguishes between primary emotion (sadness, joy, disgust), secondary, or social, emotions 
(embarrassment, pride, jealousy) which are the province of the autobiographical self, and 
background emotions (calm, tension, well-being, dis-ease) which are generated by physiological 
responses initiated in the province of the protoself. He notes that background emotions are 
diffuse in comparison to primary or secondary emotions, which tend to have an ‘object’, and are 
difficult to access consciously, for their physiological manifestation is sited in the internal milieu 
and the viscera. Consequently they are spread through our body state (our sense of being), 
rather than locatable as having an identifiable ‘cause’.  
 
But let us return to the notion that ‘deep consciousness’ affects our modes of thinking. Bergson 
claims that 
 
“…the beliefs to which we most strongly adhere are those of which we find it 
most difficult to give account…in a certain sense we have adopted them without 
any reason, for what makes them valuable in our eyes is that they match the 
colour of all our other ideas…” ibid p135.  
 
Edelman & Tononi similarly take the position that “…value systems and emotions are essential to 
the selectional workings of the brain that underlie consciousness.” (Edelman & Tononi; 2001, p 
                                                
9 Damasio considers the self not as static, resistant to the ‘ravages of time’  but a constant process of 
renewal. “Our sense of self is a state of the organism, …  a vulnerable pattern of integrated operations 
whose consequence is to generate a mental representation of a living individual being. The entire 
…edifice…is always on the brink of partial and complete collapse should the process of rebuilding and 
renewal break down. ” FWH p 145 
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209). JJ Gibson (1968), too, in his analysis of perception, argues that our perceptual responses 
are formed in response to needs determined by our value systems (physiological, conceptual, 
socio-cultural and emotional). From their different perspectives all acknowledge that there are 
responses and processes taking place beneath the level of ‘reflective/extended/higher-order10 
consciousness which affect our conscious thoughts, and may even colour the way we think. If this 
is the case, then art works which address directly the multiplicity of interweaving, perceptual and 
physiological responses which underpin our state(s) of being-in-the-world, and which are in a 
continual state of ‘becoming’ can contribute to a more discriminating understanding of our 
interactions with the world.  That those fine discriminations between the qualities of the 
sensations which underpin our state of being might not rise to the level of reflective 
consciousness does not deny their significance to the way we understand the world we are 
inhabiting at a given moment. 
 
And it is here that the rationale for my work, and that of some of my colleagues11, lies. SHOW 
MOVIE 7 The installations set up the conditions for attending to the play of corporal (or primary) 
consciousness, without the overriding distraction of the workings of extended consciousness 
have been established12. In installations such as these liminal visual images, textures and sounds 
emanate from all around the space, behind, in front of, above, even below, the visitor. The frontal 
(third person) perspective which underpins the sense of sight is dislodged. Visual images might 
initially be glimpsed as a flash of movement out of the corner of the eye, their presence sensed 
rather than seen. In most immersive installations sound emanates from speakers placed all 
around the room. This calls attention to the world which lies out of the line of sight, to the world 
‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the viewed. In the ‘active’ space in Sensuous Geographies sound alone was 
used to draw attention to the senses as a mode of understanding. The visitors who entered this 
space were blindfolded, requiring that they used other senses to navigate the environment….not 
only hearing but also the somatic systems which detect proximity to objects. 
 
In order to discourage reliance on sight, in many immersive installations both visual and sonic 
images are often diffuse, (SHOW HIDDEN MOVIE 8). This is designed to draw attention to the 
textures of the images, rather than to their representational content. In my work all the images 
have their source in human movement of some kind, but are often barely distinguishable as 
representations of anything. (SHOW MOVIE 9) Although the visitor to the installation cannot 
necessarily detect the human figure, the traces of their sources remain, and affect the 
                                                
10  Bergson refers to ‘consciousness’ as ‘reflective consciousness, Damasio as ‘extended consciousness’, 
Edelman as ‘higher order consciousness’ Higher order consciousness “…requires at the minimum a 
semantic capability, and in its most developed form, a linguistic capability” Ed. P 102It is also deeply 
implicated in a sense of self (of being conscious of being conscious) ibid. p. 
11 Gretchen Schiller, Susan Kozel, Thecla Schiphorst, Char Davies 
12 Visitors do not always achieve this state, although evidence has shown that for these individuals, repeated 
visits allow them to relinquish the desire to ‘know’ in favour of the sense of ‘knowing’. 
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physiological responses of the somatic systems directly. Here again appeal is being made to the 
sensate intelligences, for if you cannot see the edges of an image, or distinguish the separation of 
sounds in a succession of sonic events, other modes of understanding must be brought into play.   
Further, in immersive installations the sounds and images tend to be in close proximity to the 
visitor, (SHOW MOVIE 10) which makes it more difficult for the perceiver to become a mere 
observer of the image. Thus, whereas the frontal viewing environment of the painting and the 
conventional (proscenium arch) theatre work has the potential to lay the spectator open to a more 
detached approach to a work, the immersive installation foregrounds a corporal mediation of the 
work through the ‘background feelings’ generated by the images and sounds which surround the 
participating viewer. Ideally the visitor doesn’t try to understand what the images represent, but 
how they ‘feel’ in the context of its environment, as pure flow of motion, as vibration, as sensation. 
Perceptual ‘distance’ is diminished to almost nothing. ((SHOW MOVIE 11) Sight and hearing 
become intimate, rather than distant, senses.  
 
In interactive installations such as Sensuous Geographies this experience is even more intense.  
Here the visitors’ behavioural responses to the environment initiate and modulate the sensory 
qualities which are brought to presence in the installation. In Sensuous Geographies attention is 
very specifically directed to the sense the sound generates in the body, to the sense of being in 
the environment, and to the sense of proximity between visitor and visitor. This affects the way 
the visitors feel. In different sound environments the visitor might feel calm, playful, tense, even 
uncomfortable. Because the way they feel affects the way they behave, and the way they behave 
affects the tone and texture of the environment, a direct feedback system between visitors and 
environment is set into motion. The more time the visitor spends in the installation the more 
attuned they become both to the nuances of the installation and the responses of their 
physiological systems. The visitor develops an increasingly discriminating understanding of the 
nuances of the fluctuating, multimodal, dynamic space (both inner and outer) that they are 
inhabiting. ‘Understanding’ of the installation is gleaned not through a single sense, but  directly 
through the subtle interplay between the senses. ’Understanding’ gleaned through the ‘mind’ 
misses the more subtle knowledges the body affords. However, the experience of installations 
such as these might very well have an effect on the mind. This claim is supported by anecdotal 
evidence. One visitor to Sensuous Geographies returned the following day to renew his 
acquaintance with the environment. (SHOW MOVIE 12) He was convinced that the experience of 
Sensuous Geographies the night before had not only an immediate effect, but also a residual 
effect which lasted over several hours, indeed into the next day. He had a particularly difficult 
meeting scheduled for the morning of the day following his first experience of Sensuous 
Geographies. This, he said, he would usually have approached in a confrontational manner. 
However, his mood (state of being), that morning was such that he approached the meeting from 
a much calmer perspective, and adopted a more conciliatory mode of behaviour (with some 
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success). He attributed this change of  behaviour to his experiences in the installation the 
previous day13 
 
As such immersive installations are a means of countering the primacy of the verbal, and of 
regaining access to the sensation of ‘being in the world’. And, if the experts o whom ~I have 
referred in this paper are correct, such access could make us more aware of the effect the 
corporeal has on the other modes we use to understand the multiplicity of environments, physical, 
social and conceptual, that we create for ourselves. 
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